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DUE PROCESS
due to the death of many of the investigators, thereby limiting his
cross examination at trial.3" The court agreed that Batiz may
have endured some prejudice caused by the delay, but since the
delay was abundantly due to his own actions, a "general
unspecified claim of prejudice" does not provide a basis to
dismiss the indictment.3 3
In comparing the federal case and state cases relied on by the
Batiz court, the application of the law in a preindictment delay
are congruous. Both federal and state cases conclude that
although some prejudice exists against the defendant due to the
lapse of time in prosecuting a case, such delay may not deprive
the defendant of due process.
Ramanadhan v. Wingem
(decided August 12, 1997)
This Article 78 proceeding involves a due process challenge
under both the Federalu and the New York Staten' Constitutions,
where a professional's reputation and livelihood were deprived by
State action taken prior to the availability of a hearing."'
3nId.
11 Id. (citing People v. Andine, 214 A.D.2d 373, 624 N.Y.S.2d 594 (lst
Dep't 1995)). In Andine, defendant appealed his conviction for assault,
contending that the preindictment delay of four years and seven months
deprived him of due process. Id. at 373, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 595. The court
dismissed the indictment since the People failed to show that diligent efforts
were made to locate the defendant. Id. at 374-75, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 596. They
were in possession of the defendant's photograph, they knew his aliases and
his whereabouts, and, nonetheless, closed the case after six weeks. Id.
174 Misc. 2d 11, 662 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "INlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.... ." Id.
311 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." Id.
382Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 24, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 404. Here, a Special
Administrative Hearing before the New York State Department of Social
1998 977
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Specifically, the potential due process violation arose when a
physician, whose practice consisted solely of Medicaid patients,
was excluded from Medicaid, thus threatening grave professional
consequences'83 The exclusion was particularly debilitating
because it went into effect before the physician could be granted a
timely and continuous hearing.? 4 The physician an Article 78
proceeding to challenge the State's prehearing determination.
The New York County Supreme Court upheld due process
safeguards to protect reputational injury brought about by State
regulations which impose prehearing suspensions?85 The court
recognized that "the due process clause was designed to prevent
exactly this sort of injustice."386
Petitioner, a pediatrician who practiced in an area of upper
Manhattan where there is a shortage of physicians, provided
medical services in a clinic3n where one hundred percent of the
patient population was insured by Medicaid. 88 Her claim began
on November 9th of 1995, when she received a Notice of
Proposed Agency Action from the New York State Department of
Social Services [hereinafter "Department"] .389 The Notice
alleged that she had committed "unacceptable practices" pursuant
to section 515.2 of title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and
Regulations, 39° including submission of claims for treatment and
Services would afford the professional an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 13,
662 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
383 Id.
38 Id.
385 Id. at 24, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 404. Due process guards against "the loss of
[one's] profession, [one's] practice and . . . reputation for a lengthy and
indefinite period of time without the opportunity for a hearing." Id.
386 id.
387 Id. at 12, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 397. Petitioner's husband ran a pharmacy
directly across the street from the clinic. Id.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 515.2 (1995). This statute
provides in pertinent part: "An unacceptable practice" is fraudulent conduct,
including filing false claims for unnecessary medical treatment, and "[flailing
to maintain or to make available for purposes of audit or investigation records
necessary to fully disclose the medical necessity. ... ." Id.
978 [Vol 14
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prescriptions that were "false, not medically necessary, and not
supported by adequate records documenting their necessity.""
At that time, the petitioner was informed that she could deny the
charges in writing, which she did on December 20, 1995. 3r
The Department ultimately issued its "determination" on
November 26, 1996, which terminated the physician's contract
with Medicaid for three years, effective December 25, 1996.9
As was her right, petitioner requested a Special Administrative
Hearing in a letter dated December 5, 1996.1" As a result of this
request, petitioner was given a March 6, 1997 hearing date. 31
However, eight months after petitioner's initial exclusion from
Medicaid, the parties had only met for one day of testimony.3 In
an earlier ruling, the New York Supreme Court had issued a
temporary restraining order that delayed exclusion of the
petitioner from Medicaid until determination of this proceeding.3 7
However, on January 21, 1997, despite the temporary restraining
order, the Department published petitioner's name on a list of
providers barred from Medicaid."'
All States, pursuant to provisions of their respective State
Medicaid Assistance programs, are mandated by the federal
government to disclose any negative action taken against a health
care practitioner.3 When the action to exclude a doctor is
391 Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 13, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
392Id.
393 id.
394 Id.
395 id.
31 Id. This delay was the result of three adjournments over the course of the
proceeding. Id.
31 Id. This stay of exclusion allowed petitioner the opportunity to continue
in her professional capacity while agreeing to these adjournments. Id.39 Id. Her name was later taken off the list at an unspecified date. Id.
399 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-2 (a)(1) (1992). This statute provides in pertinent
part:
The State must have in effect a system of reporting. . . by
any authority of the State... responsible for the licensing of
health care practitioners (or any peer review organization or
private accreditation entity reviewing the services provided
1998
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commenced by Medicaid, it must notify "other State agencies,
the State medical licensing board, the public, [and]
beneficiaries. "0 When a doctor is barred from participation in
Medicaid, facts and circumstances of the exclusion must be
reported to the state or local authorities that are responsible for
doctor licensing and certification. 0' It is also appropriate to
report to any present employer of the physician, as well as to a
host of contingent health services agencies and health care
providers that might necessarily deal with the physician, such as
HMO's and professional organizations.: 2
Exclusion from Medicaid seriously impairs a physician's
professional privileges outside the Medicaid realm as well.
Federal regulations provide that a physician may be suspended
from a federal health care program when it can be shown that the
by health care practitioners)... [a]ny adverse action taken
by such licensing authority.
Id. Such disclosure is to be made to "the State licensing authority, any peer
review organizations, any private accreditation entity, and to the agencies
administering Federal health care programs." Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at
14, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
" See 42 C.F.R. § 1002.212 (1996). This statute provides in pertinent part:
"When the State agency initiates an exclusion under § 1002.210, it must...
notify other State agencies, the State medical licensing board (where
applicable), the public, beneficiaries, and others ...... Id. Medicaid must
also notify those entities entitled to notice of exclusion from federally funded
medical assistance under 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2005 (a) which provides in
pertinent part: "HHS will promptly notify the appropriate State(s) or local
agencies or authorities having responsibility for the licensing or certification of
an individual or entity excluded (or directed to be excluded) from participation
of the facts and circumstances of the exclusion." Id. Notice of exclusion must
also be given under 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2006 (a) which states in pertinent part:
HHS will give notice of the exclusion and the effective date
to the public, to beneficiaries ... and, as appropriate, to (1)
any entity in which the excluded individual or entity is
known to be serving as an employed . . . (4) Hospitals,
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies and health
maintenance organizations; (5) Medical societies and other
professional organizations ....
Id.
401 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2005 (a).
402 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2006 (a)..
980 [Vol 14
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individual was "otherwise sanctioned under... a State health
care program, for reasons bearing on the individual's or entity's
professional competence, professional performance or financial
integrity." Here, petitioner provided evidence that other
providers would discontinue professional privileges upon
Medicaid's exclusion.4 Indeed, MetLife Empire Plan
automatically terminates its contracts with those physicians who
have been banned by Medicaid.4 Furthermore, pursuant to New
York law, a hospital cannot be reimbursed by Medicaid for
services or prescriptions provided by a doctor who has been
excluded from its provisions.4
Federal law requires reporting by hospitals that have taken
steps against doctors resulting in an interruption of that doctor's
clinical privileges for more than thirty days.4 The United States
Code requires reporting to the State Board of Medical Examiners,
and to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services. The
' See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.601 (1996). This statute provides in pertinent part:
"The OIG may exclude an individual or entity suspended or excluded from
participation ... under ... (ii) A State health care program, for reasons
bearing on the individual's or entity's professional competence, professional
performance or financial integrity." Id.
I Ramanadhan v. Wing, 174 Misc. 2d 11, 14, 662 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
4 Id.
10N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 515.5 (a) (1995). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
No payments will be made to or on behalf of any person for
the medical care, services or supplies furnished by or under
the supervision of the person during a period of exclusion or
in violation of any condition of participation in the
program. In the case of a hospital, nursing home or home
health care provider, the department may continue payments
for up to 30 days after the date of exclusion for clients
admitted prior to the exclusion or whose plan of care was
implemented prior to the exclusion.
Id.
I Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 15, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (a)(1) (1995). This statute provides in pertinent
part: "Each health care entity which . takes a professional review action
that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer
than 30 days ... shall report to the Board of Medical Examiners. . . ." Id.
1998
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information must be provided at least monthly, where it is stored
and made accessible in a data bank that hospitals must check
whenever a doctor applies for a staff position or for admitting
privileges. 409  The data bank must also be checked every two
years for any information pertaining to current staff members and
doctors with admitting privileges .410 Under the Code, 41"  a
presumption exists that imputes knowledge of any reported
information, regardless of whether the hospital actually obtains
it. 4 12
Once an administrative determination to exclude a physician
from Medicaid has become final, with no further appeal pending,
a finding of professional misconduct becomes conclusive. 4 ,3  At
this point, the Office of Professional Misconduct affixes a penalty
after a hearing based solely on the issue of the penalty to be
imposed.4 4 In the present case, the Department set forth in its
answer a principle of administrative law under section 7801(1) of
See 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (b) (1995). This statue provides in pertinent part:
"Each Board of Medical Examiners shall report [to the Secretary] the
information reported to it under subsection (a). ... " Id.
409Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 15, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
410 Id.
411 See 42 U.S.C. §11135(b) (1995). This statute provides in pertinent part:
"with respect to a medical malpractice action, a hospital which does not
request information respecting a physician ... is presumed to have knowledge
of any information reported under this subchapter. . . ." Id.4 Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 15, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
413 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (9)(c) (McKinney 1985). This statute provides
in pertinent part: "[Tihe following is professional misconduct... [h]aving
been found guilty in an adjudicatory proceeding of violating a state or federal
statute or regulation, pursuant to a final decision or determination, and when
no appeal is pending .... " Id.
414 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 230 (10)(p) (McKinney 1997). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
In cases of professional misconduct based solely upon a
violation of subdivision nine of section sixty-five hundred
thirty of the education law, the director may direct that
charges be prepared and served and may refer the matter to a
committee on professional conduct for its review and report
of findings, conclusions as to guilt, and determination.
Id. In the present case, a fine of $102,000 was affixed. Ramanadhan, 174
Misc. 2d at 12, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
[Vol 14
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the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, "" pursuant to which
a petitioner may only seek an Article 78 judicial proceeding upon
exhaustion of all other administrative remedies. However, the
court emphasized that the present action involves a constitutional
challenge to which the rule does not pertain.416 Therefore, the
Article 78 proceeding was appropriately filed.417
Petitioner's claim was based on the circumstances surrounding
her long-anticipated hearing: (1) non-continuous proceedings; (2)
protracted hearing schedules due to the Department's backlog;
and (3) post-hearing decisions rendered months after conclusion
of the hearing.418 These allegations were generally denied by the
Department, but were not rebutted by further evidence.
Accordingly, they must be deemed admitted.
419
The statutory regulations that govern Medicaid provider
hearings are silent on the issue of length of time allowable
between Determination notice and hearing date.' z The following
is required by statute: (1) a request for a hearing must formally
be made within sixty days of the issuance of the final
Determination;42' (2) written notice of the hearing date must be
made fifteen days prior;'" and (3) a post-hearing decision must be
415 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1994). This statute provides in pertinent
part: "Except where otherwise provided by law, a proceeding under this
article shall not be used to challenge a determination... which is not final or
can be adequately reviewed by appeal ... ." Id.416 RaManadha, 174 Misc. 2d at 15, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
417Id.
418 Id. at 16, 662. N.Y.S.2d at 399.
4191d.
420 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 519.1 (1995).
421 N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 519.1 provides in pertinent
part: "Any clear, written communication to the department by or on behalf of
a person requesting review of a department's final determination is a request
for a hearing if made within 60 days of the date of the department's written
determination." Id.
422 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REas. tit. 18, § 519.10 provides in
pertinent part:
At least 15 calendar days prior to the date of the hearing,
written notice must be sent to the parties and their
representatives. The notice must inform them of: (a) the
date, time and place of the hearing and the parties' right to
9831998
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handed down within one hundred and twenty days. 423  As is
evident, there is no time limit imposed for a requested hearing to
take place. 44  Furthermore, "there is no requirement for the
hearing to be conducted in a reasonably continuous manner." 4s
The United States Supreme Court employed a balancing test in
Barry v. Barchi,426 to conclude that important public interests
outweigh an individual's private liberty interest in the issuance of
a pre-hearing suspension.27 In Barry, a New York statute
required suspension of a horse trainer's license where post-race
testing of the horse uncovered evidence of drugs in the horse's
system .4  The Court noted that the State has ample interest in
preserving the integrity of a gaming sport carried on under its
request an adjournment or change of venue; (b) the manner
and means by which adjournments or changes of venue may
be requested and granted; (c) the issues which are to be the
subject of the hearing; (d) the manner in which the hearing
will be conducted; and (e) the right of each party to be
represented himself/herself, to testify, to produce witnesses,
to present documentary evidence and to examine opposing
witnesses.
Id.
23 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 519.22. This statute provides
in pertinent part:
(a) A written hearing decision will be made by the
commissioner or by a person designated to act on behalf of
the commissioner and must be based exclusively on the
record and testimony introduced at the hearing. (b) The
decision will be issued as promptly as possible, but in any
event within 120 days of the conclusion of the hearing or the
closing of the record.
Id.
424 Ramanadhan 174 Misc. 2d at 16, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1997).
425 Id.
426 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (suspending a horse trainer's license while not
assured of a prompt postsuspension hearing, was held unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment given the trainer's
substantial interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy and the state's
minimal interest in delaying such a determination).
427 Id. at 64.
428 Id. at 57-59.
[Vol 14984
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auspices, and therefore allowed pre-hearing suspension despite a
recognized liberty interest on the part of the trainer.419 However,
the Court went on to state that a hearing should be held "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," 410 and found that
due process was not served where a prompt postsuspension
hearing was not assured. 41 "Once suspension has been imposed,
the trainer's interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy
becomes paramount .... In these circumstances, it was
necessary that Barchi be assured a prompt postsuspension
hearing, one that would proceed and be concluded without
appreciable delay." 432
Similarly, the State of New York requires meaningful timing
for post-hearing suspensions. In the case of Pelaez v. Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor,'4 33 petitioner, a twenty-year,
nontenured employee of the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor, was suspended without pay while awaiting
determination of charges of illicit meetings with a labor leader
who was under investigation by the Commission. 31 In Pelaez,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a three-
month delay was violative of due process, and required that
"such a payless suspension may continue for a reasonable period,
or stated another way, so long as the trial or hearing on the
charges is held within a reasonably prompt time." 45
In the present case, the court went on to determine whether due
process protection should be invoked, specifically where
Medicaid regulations would permit four months delay in granting
a decision both pre- and post-hearing. 36 The court stated that
429Id. at 64.
430 Id. at 66 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
431 Id.
432 Id.
433 77 A.D.2d 947, 947-48, 431 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding
that a payless suspension of a twenty-year, nontenured employee requires a
reasonably prompt trial or hearing on the charges).
434 Id. at 947, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
435 Id. at 948, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
436 Ramanadhan v. Wing, 174 Misc. 2d at 17, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 399-400
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
1998
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under such circumstances, due process would indeed be necessary
to protect a valid liberty or property interest. 437 Accordingly, the
court then proceeded to question whether such interests exist in
this case.438 While it has been shown that a Medicaid provider
lacks a property interest in "continuing to participate in
Medicaid," '39 there is a liberty interest in freedom from
stigmatizing allegations made by the State that preclude one's
right to work."0 In addition, where such damaging allegations
affect one's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,"144 the
individual has a right to refute the charges and "clear one's name
at a hearing."442
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,"3 the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that provided for
"posting" of notices in liquor stores, absent a hearing.444 These
notices prohibited sale or gifts of liquor to one exhibiting
"excessive drinking" behavior."5  "[T]he label or
characterization given a person by 'posting'. . . [is] such a stigma
437 Id.
438 Id. at 17, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
439 Id. (citing Schaubman v. Blum, 49 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 402 N.E.2d 1133,
1135, 426 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (1980)).
440 Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (holding that a statute which
based the right to employment on citizenship status was found to violate equal
protection under the Due Process Clause, affirming a personal liberty interest
in one's right to work in the common occupations of everyday life absent
intrusion by the State).
44' Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)
(holding that a dismissal of a nontenured teacher after one year of employment
by the State does not violate due process rights so long as his good name and
status in the community were not compromised, which otherwise would have
required notice and an opportunity to be heard).
442 Rananadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 17, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
443 400 U.S. 433 (1971) The Court found the Wisconsin statute
unconstitutional for allowing "posting" of a notice in retail liquor outlets
forbidding sale or gift of liquor to one suspected of "excessive drinking." Id.
at 434. Such "posting" violates procedural due process by affixing a
stigmatizing label without benefit of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
at 436.
44Id. at 434.
445 Id.
986 [Vol 14
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 3, Art. 27
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/27
DUE PROCESS
or badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard.""4
This right to procedural due process was limited in the case of
Paul v. Davis.447  A flyer depicting Davis as an "Active
Shoplifter" was distributed by the police chiefs to area merchants
after his arrest on a shoplifting charge." 8 The charge was later
dismissed and Davis brought suit claiming a due process violation
stemming from "the infliction by state officials of a 'stigma' to
[his] reputation . . . . "44 The Court distinguished
Constantineaul" by showing that the liquor store "posting" in
that case not only defamed the aggrieved respondent, but also
altered her legal status by depriving her of a common right to
purchase liquor.4 1  This additional loss under state law was not
present in the case, and thus due process issues could not be
invoked.42 "But the interest in reputation alone which respondent
seeks to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different
from the "liberty" or "property" recognized in [other]
decisions." 4n
Numerous cases since Paul v. Davis have expanded the "stigma
plus" test which now requires a showing beyond mere
reputational injury in order to suffice for a liberty or property
interest.4M In Brandt v. Board of Cooperative Educational
Services, 5 a teacher who was discharged amidst claims of sexual
"4Id. at 436.
4 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (claiming that reputational injury alone as evidenced
by publication of one's name and likeness on an 'Active Shoplifter' list does
not rise to the level of liberty or property interests normally afforded
procedural protection).
4481 Id. at 695.
4491d. at 701.
450 Constandneau, 400 U.S. 433.
451 Paul, 424 U.S. at 711.
452Id. at 711.
453 Id.
41 See, e.g., Ramanadhan v. Wing, 174 Misc. 2d 11, 21, 662 N.Y.S.2d
393, 402 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1997).
455 820 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that charges of sexual misconduct
lodged against a teacher resulting in his discharge does not alone amount to a
deprivation of liberty; rather, a showing that such charges, recorded in his
1998 987
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misconduct, proved a "stigma plus" where his future job
opportunities were threatened by virtue of "allegedly false and
defamatory charges in his personnel file," which were then
available to potential employers. 456
Many New York cases have espoused the view in dictum that
public dissemination of false allegations that stigmatize one's
professional endeavors threatens a liberty interest, thus invoking
due process protection.457 However, in a case factually similar to
Ramanadhan, the Second Circuit in Senape v. Constantino48 held
that a physician discharged from Medicaid failed to satisfy the
"stigma plus" test. 459 Specifically, the federal court here felt that
there was not a showing of a deprivation of a tangible interest
above and beyond mere reputational injury brought about by
exclusion from Medicaid. 41° "Plaintiff herein cannot point to any
specific deprivation of his opportunity to seek employment with
others caused by state action. 46'
In concluding its analysis, the court in Ramanadhan refused to
follow the Second Circuit's holding in Senape.462 The petitioner
personnel file, would likely preclude future employment opportunities, is
sufficiently stigmatizing to require notice and an opportunity to be heard).456 Id. at 42.457Bezar v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Social Serv., 151 A.D.2d 44, 50, 546 N.Y.S.2d
195, 199 (3d Dep't 1989) (claiming that physicians, denied the opportunity by
the Department of Social Services to re-enroll in state's Medicaid program,
could not allege a right to a name-clearing hearing absent the essential
prerequisite of public dissemination of stigmatizing allegations).
4" No. 93 CIV 5182, 1995 WL 29502 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a
physician excluded and denied re-enrollment in Medicaid is precluded from
claiming a liberty interest when he retains his license to practice medicine and
is not specifically foreclosed by the State from future employment
opportunities).
419 Id. at *9.
41 Id. Here, the physician retained his license to practice medicine and could
continue to do so. Id. at *8.
461 Id.
462 Ramanadhan v. Wing, 174 Misc. 2d 11, 21, 662 N.Y.S.2d 383, 402
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1997) (citing Fields v. Board of Higher
Education, 94 A.D.2d 202, 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (1st Dep't 1983)).
"A state court is not bound under the doctrine of stare decisis by the opinions
of the federal courts." Id.
988 [Vol 14
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 3, Art. 27
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/27
DUE PROCESS
here may have retained her license to practice medicine, but her
ability to continue to do so, especially in her established practice
where all of her patients were only covered by Medicaid, was
seriously impaired so long as she was excluded for misconduct.
Here, Ramanadhan's interruption of clinical privileges will
need to be reported to a national data bank. This is a public
dissemination of negative information that threatens professional
viability.4 Furthermore, all potential employers have been
deemed "appropriate" for reporting pursuant to New York law. 'M
"It ignores reality to focus on the doctor's retention of a medical
license, when, in fact, virtually all professional opportunities will
be foreclosed and petitioner's clinics will be put out ofbusiness. "46
What's more, the "data bank"4 67 in Ramanadhan was found to
be roughly equivalent to the "personnel file" in Brandt.1s As in
Brandt, the data bank may suffice as a "plus" for triggering due
process protection.49  Accordingly, under New York law,
stigmatizing allegations that result in loss of employment or
potential for future employment require a hearing.I'1 Due process
guarantees "fairness" of process, which in this case, demands a
timely hearing "conducted in a reasonably continuous manner."'T
On these facts, federal courts would not find a threatened
liberty interest, as in Senape, where the physician retains his/her
461 Id. at 20, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
464 Id.
465 id.
466Id. at 21, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
467 id.
4 Brandt v. Bd. of Cooperative Educ. Serv., 820 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir.
1987).
49 Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 21, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
470 See, e.g., Lee TIT. v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 642
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1996) (holding that dissemination of allegations of child abuse
via a state-sponsored Central Register that seriously jeopardize future
employment prospects must first be proved by a fair preponderance of the
evidence). See also Pelaez v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 77
A.D.2d 947, 431 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1980); Bezar v. New York State
Dep't of Social Serv., 151 A.D.2d 44, 546 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 1989).
" Ramanadhan, 174 Misc. 2d at 24, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
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license and the data bank for dissemination of stigmatizing
information is not specifically targeted at future employers.4 n In
contrast, the Supreme Court, New York County, expressly
refused to follow Senape, holding instead that the regulations
providing for prehearing suspension of Medicaid providers were
unconstitutional for lack of procedures to afford a timely and
continuous hearing. 73 The dissemination of information, like the
data bank in Ramanadhan, imperils one's reputation while
threatening future professional opportunities, a "plus" that
triggers a due process shield of protection. 474
472Id. at 20, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
473 Id. at 20, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
474 Id. at 17, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
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